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Abstract The price of anarchy (PoA) has been widely used in static games to quantify
the loss of efficiency due to noncooperation. Here, we extend this concept to a general
differential games framework. In addition, we introduce the price of information (PoI)
to characterize comparative game performances under different information structures,
as well as the price of cooperation to capture the extent of benefit or loss a player accrues
as a result of altruistic behavior. We further characterize PoA and PoI for a class of
scalar linear quadratic differential games under open-loop and closed-loop feedback
information structures. We also obtain some explicit bounds on these indices in a large
population regime.
Keywords Differential games · Nash equilibria · efficiency · price of anarchy · price
of information · price of cooperation · linear-quadratic games · information structures
1 Introduction
It is well known that the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in nonzero-sum games is
generally inefficient [11], which means that it would be possible for all players to do
better in terms of attaining higher utilities or lower costs (than they would attain under
Nash equilibria, even if the equilibrium is unique) through a cooperative behavior. This
is true for static deterministic games, and naturally also for stochastic games as well
as dynamic and differential games. In these latter of classes of games, one could bring
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2up additional issues with regard to Nash equilibria beyond efficiency or lack thereof,
such as whether an increase in information to one player (or all or a subset of the
players) would be advantageous to that player (or groups of players), in terms of
attaining higher utilities or lower costs, or whether acquiring more information would
be undesirable for a player. In the special class of games where all players have the
same utility function or cost function (that is, team problems) and what is sought is
the global maximum or global minimum of these functions, the answer to such a query
is clean, which is that additional information (defined as expansion of sigma fields)
can never hurt. The same is true for the special class of zero-sum games. In stochastic
games, or dynamic and differential games which are not team problems or zero-sum
games, however, the answer is not that clean, and one could encounter quite surprising
and at the outset counter-intuitive results. Perhaps the first demonstration of this
was reported in [5] and [8], where two classes of two-player stochastic static games
were considered, one a linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) model and the other one a
stochastic Cournot duopoly model, both of which admit unique Nash equilibria. It was
shown that for the LQG model better information (on some stochastic variables) for
only one player leads to lower average Nash equilibrium costs for both players, but in the
duopoly model only the player whose information is improved benefits while the other
one hurts (in the sense that his average Nash equilibrium cost increases). Another way
of comparison would be in terms of the relative values of the average Nash equilibrium
costs attained by the players, when one player has informational advantage over the
other. It was again shown in [5] that, in an otherwise completely symmetric game,
the player who has better information attains higher cost than the other player in
the LQG model (the counter-intuitive result), whereas he attains lower cost in the
duopoly model (the intuitive result). Several manifestations of these conclusions can
be seen also in dynamic and differential games; for example time-consistent open-loop
Nash equilibrium is not necessarily inferior to the strongly time-consistent closed-loop
feedback Nash equilibrium [9].
Now coming back to inefficiency of Nash equilibrium in a fixed nonzero-sum game,
one question of interest is exploration of the extent of this inefficiency, that is how
far off is a Nash equilibrium from the socially optimal solution, which is obtained as
the maximum of the sum of the utilities of the players, or some convex combination
of the utilities (or minimum in the case of cost functions). The notion of the price of
anarchy (PoA)was introduced in [19] as a quantification of this offset, as a utility ratio
between the worst possible Nash solution (among multiple Nash equilibria) and the
social optimum. In a way, this index serves to quantify the loss of efficiency due to
competition. It has been shown that in routing games and resource allocation games
(see, [19] and [16]), PoA is bounded by a constant, allowing agents to achieve some
level of efficiency despite being suboptimal.
The idea of quantifying the gap between social optimality and game equilibrium
solutions sparked many follow-up work in that same vein. In [20], price of simplicity has
been introduced for a pricing game in communication networks as the ratio between the
revenue collected from a flat pricing rule and the maximum possible revenue. In [15],
price of uncertainty has been introduced to measure the relative payoff of an expert user
of a security game under complete information to the one under incomplete information.
In [22], price of leadership has been proposed as a measure of comparison of utilities in
a power control game between Nash equilibria and Stackelberg solutions. In all of these
works, primarily communication networks have been used as a backdrop application
domain, be it routing, resource allocation, power control, or security. Game-theoretical
3methods along with Nash equilibrium have found many applications in communication
networks, with some selected recent references being [1–3,7,16–18,23]
In this paper, we discuss several indices which quantify variations or offsets in the
payoff values or costs attained under Nash equilibria in the context of differential games
(DGs). We first extend the notion of PoA to DGs, which heretofore has been primarily
limited to static continuous kernel games. We provide a characterization of PoA for a
class of scalar linear-quadratic (LQ) DGs, and quantify the efficiency loss in the long
run when the players behave non-cooperatively under the Nash equilibrium concept.
We consider both open-loop (OL) and closed-loop (CL) information structures (ISs).
We show that for the class of scalar LQ DGs with CL IS using the strongly time-
consistent CL feedback Nash equilibrium, the PoA has some appealing computable
upper bounds, which can further be approximated when the number of players is
sufficiently large (that is, the large population regime), whereas, under the OL IS, it is
possible to obtain an expression for the PoA in closed form.
As mentioned earlier, going from static to dynamic (differential) games brings in
the possibility of various ISs, which add richness to the (Nash equilibrium) solution of
a game. Different ISs (generally) yield different equilibrium solutions, and hence IS is
a crucial factor in the investigation of PoA in DGs. Motivated by this, we introduce
another index, the price of information (PoI), which is a result of the comparison of the
equilibrium utilities or costs under different ISs. For the class of scalar LQ DGs above,
we show that the PoI between the feedback and open-loop ISs is shown to be bounded
from below by
√
2/2 and from above by
√
2, again in the large population regime.
Finally, motivated by some recent results reported in [4] on the level of cooperation
between players in a routing game, captured by the degree of willingness of a player to
place partial weight on other players’ utilities in his utility function, we introduce the
price of cooperation (PoC) as a measure of benefit or loss to a player on his base Nash
equilibrium payoff due to cooperation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a general N-
player DG framework with different ISs, and define in this context the indices, PoA,
PoI, and PoC. In Section 3, we investigate the PoA for a class of scalar LQ feedback
DGs. In Section 4, we study the LQ DGs under open-loop IS, and in Section 5, we
establish bounds on the PoI. We conclude and identify future directions in Section 6.
An earlier version of some of the results in this paper can be found in the recent
conference paper [21].
2 General Problem Formulation
In this section we first introduce the general nonzero-sum differential games framework
along with the Nash equilibrium solution, and then introduce the three indices: prices
of anarchy, information, and cooperation.
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , N} be the set of players, and [0, T 〉1 be the time interval of
interest. At each time instant t ∈ [0, T 〉, each player, say Player i, chooses an mi-
dimensional control value (action) ui(t) from his set of feasible control values Ui ⊂ Rmi ,
where we also make the standard assumption that as a function of t the control function
ui(·) is piecewise continuous on [0, T 〉. The state variable x is of dimension n, and takes
1 The notation “〉” is introduced to capture two cases: finite horizon when T is finite (in
which case we have [0, T ]), and infinite horizon when T is infinite (in which case we have
[0,∞)).
4values in Rn; as a function of time, t, we assume x(·) to be piecewise continuously
differentiable on [0, T 〉, and evolving according to the differential equation:
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u1(t), · · · , uN (t), t) , x(0) = x0 ,
where x0 ∈ R is the initial value of the state and the system dynamics f(·) : Ω → Rn
is defined on the set
Ω = {(x, u1, · · · , uN , t)|x ∈ Rn, t ∈ [0, T 〉, ui ∈ Ui, i ∈ N} ,
as a jointly piecewise continuous function which is also Lipschitz in x, and also possibly
Lipschitz in the ui’s, depending on whether the underlying information structure (IS)
is open loop of closed loop feedback.
We will consider two different ISs: Open loop (OL),, where the controls are just
functions of time, t (and also of initial state x0, which however is assumed to be fixed
and a known parameter of the game), and closed-loop state-feedback, where the controls
are allowed to be functions of current value of the state and of time, that is, for Player
i, ui(t) = γi(t;x(t)). In the latter case, γi : [0, T 〉 × Rn → Ui is known as the policy
variable (strategy) of Player i, which is a mapping from the set of information available
to the player to his control (action) set.2 We require each γi(t; ·) to be Lipschitz in x,
in addition to being jointly piecewise continuous in its arguments, and denote the class
of all such mappings by Γi. We further require that f be Lipschitz not only in x but
also in {u1, . . . , uN}, so that the differential equation generating the state,
x˙(t) = f(x(t), γ1(t;x(t)), · · · , γN (t;x(t)), t) , x(0) = x0 ,
admits a unique piecewise continuously differentiable solution for each γi ∈ Γi, i ∈ N .
Clearly, when a particular γi does not depend on x (such as the OL IS), then it would
be captured as a special case, and hence to capture this also notationally, we will write
γi ∈ Γi as γηi ∈ Γ ηi , where η stands for the underlying IS (which for the discussion in
this paper is either OL or CL SF).3
Each player i ∈ N is a cost-minimizer, with the objective function for Player i, as
defined on the state and action spaces, is given by
Li(u) =
∫ T
0
Fi(x(t), u1(t), · · · , uN (t), t)dt+ Si(x(T ))
when T <∞, and
Li(u) =
∫ ∞
0
Fi(x(t), u1(t), · · · , uN (t), t)dt
when T = ∞, where u := {u1, . . . , uN}. In the expressions above, for each i ∈ N , the
function Fi : Ω → R is Player i’s instantaneous (running) cost function, and in the first
2 One can introduce more general ISs, such as those that involve memory, but here we will
restrict the discussion to only OL and CL state-feedback (SF) structures so as not to encounter
informational non-uniqueness of Nash equilibria [9].
3 Even though in general different players can have different ISs, we will consider here only
the case when the IS in the entire DG is either OL or CL SF. Otherwise, derivation of Nash
equilibrium becomes complicated, and one has to introduce small noise robustness in order
to eliminate informational non-uniqueness, even in LQ DGs [6], [9]. At the conceptual level,
however, the analysis in this paper, and the indices introduced, equally apply to the mixed IS
case.
5expression Si : R
n → R is the terminal value function. Substituting ui(t) = γi(t;x(t))
in the above, we arrive at the e˙m normal or strategic form of the DG, where now
the dependence in Li is on γi’s instead of ui’s. Let us denote this new cost function
representation by Ji, for Player i, which we write more explicitly (showing its argument)
as Ji(γ
η), where γη := {γη1 , . . . , γηN} ∈ Γ η := Γ η1 × · · · × Γ ηN , where again this covers
also the OL IS as a special case; we will occasionally drop the superscript η when the
IS is clear from context.
Let γη−i denote the collection of policies of all players except Player i, i.e., γ
η
−i =
(γη1 , . . . , γ
η
i−1, γ
η
i+1, . . . , γ
η
N ) , in a game with IS η. If γ
η
−i is fixed as γ
η∗
−i, Player i is
faced with the dynamic optimization (optimal control) problem: 4
(OC(i)) min
γi∈Γηi
Ji(γi, γ
η∗
−i) :=
∫ T
0
Fi(x, γi(η), γ
η∗
−i(η), t)dt+ Si(x(T )) (1)
s.t. x˙(t) = f(x, γi(η), γ
η∗
−i(η), t) , x(0) = x0 .
In the case of infinite horizon, the problem remains the same with Si ≡ 0 and
T =∞. If we denote the solution to OC(i) by γηi
∗
, and carry out the optimization for
each i, then what we have is a Nash equilibrium compatible with the IS that defines
the DG. This is made precise below.
Definition 1 [η-Nash equilibrium] For a DG with IS η, the policy N-tuple {γηi
∗
, i ∈
N} =: γη∗ is an η−Nash equilibrium if, for each i ∈ N , γη∗i solves the optimal control
problem (OC(i)). Let Γ η∗ be the set of all η−Nash equilibria, as a subset of Γ η.
Now, for the CL IS case, one has to further refine the Nash equilibrium, in order
to eliminate informational non-uniqueness. Consider a family of DGs, structured the
same way, but defined over the time interval [s, T 〉, where s > 0 is the parameter that
identifies different elements of the family. We say that an η-Nash equilibrium, when
η is the CL IS is strongly time consistent if its restriction to [s, T 〉 is also an η-Nash
equilibrium, and this being true for each s and all x(s). Such Nash equilibria could
also be called sub-game perfect equilibria, by direct analogy with a similar concept in
finite games. We will henceforth consider only strongly time consistent Nash equilibria
when η is CL, but will suppress that refinement in the development below.
Let J
η∗
i , i ∈ N , denote the achieved values of the objective functions of the players
under a particular η−Nash equilibrium γη∗, and a corresponding total cost achieved
(as a convex combination of the individual costs) be given by Jη∗µ =
∑
i∈N µiJ
η∗
i ,
where µi is a positive weighting factor on Player i’th cost, satisfying the normalization
condition
∑
i∈N µi = 1. We assume, without any loss of generality, that J
η∗
i > 0 for
all i ∈ N , and hence a fortiori Jη∗µ > 0.
Now as a benchmark, let us consider the case of full coordination, where the players
agree on minimizing a single objective function, which is a convex combination of
the individual cost functions. We may call this also a socially optimal solution. The
corresponding underlying optimization problem is the optimal control problem: 5
(COC) min
γ∈Γ
N∑
i=1
µi
{∫ T
0
Fi(x(t), γ(η), t)dt+ Si(x(T ))
}
s.t. x˙(t) = f(x, γ(η), t) , x(0) = x0 ,
4 We use “OC(i)” to denote Player i’s individual optimal control problem.
5 The acronym “COC” stands for “Centralized Optimal Control”.
6where the optimization could also be carried out with respect to control values, u,
that is in an open-loop fashion, since the problem is deterministic and also is not
strategic. Hence, the optimal value of this optimal control problem is independent of
the IS, which we denote by J◦µ, and the corresponding (open-loop) optimal control by
u◦ = [u◦1, . . . , u◦N ]. Note that we necessarily have 0 < J
◦
µ 6 J
η∗
µ , where J
η∗
µ is under
any Nash equilibrium solution out of Γ η∗.
Definition 2 (Price of Anarchy) Consider an N-person DG as above and its asso-
ciated optimal control problem (COC) with J◦µ > 0. The price of anarchy for the DG
is6
ρηN,µ,T = maxγη∗∈Γη∗
Jη∗µ /J◦µ (2)
as the worst-case ratio of the total game cost to the optimum social cost.
In addition to its dependence on the cost functions, PoA depends on the number of
players in the game, the IS, the weights on individual players and the time horizon.
Note that the PoA as defined in (2) is lower-bounded by 1.
Definition 3 (Price of Information (PoI)) Let η1 and η2 be two ISs. Consider two
N-person DGs which differ only in terms of their ISs, with game 1 having IS η1, and
game 2 having η2. Let the values of a particular µ convex combination of the objective
functions be Jη1µ
∗
and Jη2µ
∗
, respectively, achieved under the Nash equilibria γη1∗ and
γη2∗. The price of information between the two ISs (under cost minimization) is given
by
χη2η1(µ) = max
γη
∗
2∈Γη∗2
J
η∗
2
µ / max
γη
∗
1∈Γη∗1
J
η∗
1
µ . (3)
The PoI compares the worst-case costs under two different ISs for the same convex
combination, and quantifies the relative loss or gain when the DG is played under a
different IS. Clearly, when χη2η1(µ) < 1, the IS η2 is superior to its counterpart η1 . The
connection between PoI and PoA can be captured by χη2η1(µ) = ρ
η2
N,µ,T /ρ
η1
N,µ,T .
Before introducing the third index (price of cooperation), let us define another
class of DGs, which is an intermediate case between full cooperation and full non-
cooperation. Consider the case where Player i, even though his cost function is Ji,
adopts an altruistic mode and minimizes instead a cost function that places some
weight on other players’ costs. Let λi := {λji , j ∈ N} be a set of nonnegative parameters
adding up to 1,
∑
j∈N λ
j
i = 1. Let J˜i(γ
η;λi) , i ∈ N be defined by
J˜i(γ
η;λi) :=
∑
j∈N
λjiJj(γ
η) , i ∈ N
Consider the η IS DG with cost functions J˜ ’s, and let Γ˜ η be the set of all its η-Nash
equilibria. For γ˜η ∈ Γ˜ η, Player i achieves an actual cost of Ji(γ˜η), which may be
better (lower) or worse (higher) than Jη∗i defined earlier. Note that if λ
j
i = µi for all
i, j ∈ N , then all players have the same cost function, and every η-Nash equilibrium
solution of the altruistic game is a solution to COC, assuming that person by person
optimal solutions of COC are globally optimal. Hence, in this limiting case we have
full cooperation. This now brings us to the third index, which is keyed to individual
players.
6 If the maximum below does not exist, then it is replaced by supremum in the definition of
PoA.
7Definition 4 (Price of Cooperation (PoC)) Consider an N-player DG with a fixed
IS η, and with a fixed set of cooperation vectors λ := {λi, i ∈ N}. Let J˜i, i ∈ N , and
Γ˜ η be as defined above, and Γ η be the set of all Nash equilibria of the original game.
Then, the price of cooperation for Player i under the cooperation scheme λ is given by
νηi (λ) = max
γ∈Γ˜η
Ji(γ)/ max
γ∈Γη
Ji(γ) . (4)
As indicated earlier, if λi = µ for all i, where µ = {µi, i ∈ N} as in PoA, then
every NE of {J˜i, i ∈ N} is a person-by-person optimal solution of the COC with cost
function Jµ, which would also be globally optimal under some appropriate convexity
conditions. If γ0 is one such solution, minimizing Jµ, then the PoC is given by
νηi (µ) = Ji(γ)/ maxγ∈Γη
Ji(γ) ,
which can be viewed as the reciprocal of individualized PoA, where the latter is a
measure of the loss or gain an individual player incurs on his individual cost when
he (along with other players) plays the worst NE strategy as opposed to the globally
minimizing strategy (again along with other players).
3 Scalar LQ Feedback Differential Games
The analysis of the price of anarchy is complex for general DGs as there often exist
more than one Nash equilibrium, which show strong dependence on the underlying IS.
For specific game structures, however, its analysis may be tractable provided that we
avoid informational non-uniqueness. One such class is scalar linear quadratic DGs with
state feedback IS, which is what we focus on in this section. These games also enjoy
wide applications in economics and communication networks; see, [10], [2]. We first
state our model and recall some important relevant results on LQ feedback DGs; for
details, see [9], [14].
3.1 Game Model
As a special case of the class of DGs considered in the previous section, consider the
infinite-horizon scalar N−person LQ DGs, with quadratic cost function
Li(u) =
∫ ∞
0
(
qix
2(t) + riu
2
i (t)
)
dt, i ∈ N , (5)
x˙(t) = ax(t) +
N∑
i=1
biui(t), x(0) = x0 , (6)
where qi > 0, ri > 0, x0 6= 0, bi 6= 0 are all scalar quantities. Let b := [b1, . . . , bN ]. We
are interested in strongly time-consistent state-feedback (SF) Nash equilibrium (NE),
where further the NE policies are required to be stationary (that is time invariant). We
will refer to such equilibria in short as Feedback NE. The following theorem provides
their characterization.
8Theorem 1 [Feedback NE, [9], [14]] Let {ki, i ∈ N} solve the set of coupled algebraic
Riccati equations
2
a− N∑
j=1
sjkj
 ki + qi + sik2i = 0, i ∈ N (7)
satisfying the stability condition a −∑Ni=1 siki < 0 , where si := b2i /ri. Then, the
N-tuple of policies γ∗i (x) = − biri kix, i ∈ N , constitutes a feedback NE, with the corre-
sponding cost for Player i being J∗i = kix
2
0. Furthermore, the positively weighed total
cost is J∗µ = k¯x20, where k¯ =
∑N
i=1 µiki.
If the set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations do not admit a solution which is also
stabilizing, then the DG does not have a feedback NE. ⋄
The main challenge in computing the feedback NE solution for this DG is that
equation (7) is a nonlinear coupled system of equations. The fact that we have a
scalar problem alleviates the difficulty somewhat, since it is possible to turn it into a
linear problem through a change of variables, as outlined in [12], [13]. Let σi = siqi,
σmax = maxi σi, pi = siki, i = 1, . . . , N , and
λ =
N∑
i=1
pi − a. (8)
Multiplying (7) by si, we rewrite it as
p2i − 2λpi + σi = 0, i = 1, . . . , N. (9)
Let Ω ⊂ N be an index set, Ω−i = Ω\{i}, and nΩ = |Ω|. For every Ω 6= ∅, we have
(after some manipulations)
∏
j∈Ω
pjλ =
1
2nΩ − 1


∑
i∈Ω
σi
∏
j∈Ω−i
pj −
∑
i/∈Ω
∏
j∈Ω
pjpi + a
∏
j∈Ω
pj

 . (10)
When Ω = ∅, we define ∏
j∈Ω
pjλ := λ =
N∑
j=1
pj − a. (11)
Hence, for every Ω, we have an equation in the form of either (10) or (11). Let p =
[1, p1, p2, . . . , pN , p1p2, . . . , p1pN , p2p3, . . . , pN−1pN , . . . ,
∏N
i=1 pi]
T . We can write (10)
and (11) into
M˜p = λp. (12)
Let p := [1, k1, k2, . . . , kN , k1k2, . . . , k1kN , k2k3, . . . , kN−1kN , . . . ,
∏N
i=1 ki]
T and D =
diag{1, s1, s2, . . ., sN , s1s2, . . ., s1sN ,s2s3, . . . , sN−1sN , . . . ,
∏N
i=1 si} . Hence, we can
rewrite p = Dk and (12) into
Mk = λk, where M := D−1M˜D . (13)
Equation (13) is an eigenvalue problem with each index set Ω corresponding to a row
enumerated starting from the empty set. It has maximum 2N distinct eigenvalues and
2N eigenvectors. The vector formed by the second entry to the N + 1-st entry of the
eigenvectors yields the solution to (7) when the first entry of the vector is normalized
to 1 and they satisfy the stability condition of Theorem 1. This leads to:
9Theorem 2 [Feedback NE Computation, [14]] Suppose M is a nondefective matrix
with distinct eigenvalues. Let (λ,k) be an eigenvalue-eigenvector pair such that λ ∈ R+
and λ > σmax. Then, a feedback NE γ
∗
i (x) = − biri ki x, i ∈ N , is yielded by k
∗ = 1Tk
provided that the resulting solution is stabilizing, where 1 = [0, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0]T is a
vector whose 2nd to N + 1-st entries are 1’s.
Theorem 3 [Uniqueness of Feedback NE] Let p¯ :=
∑
j∈N pj , p−i :=
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i pj.
There exists a unique feedback NE for the LQ DG described by (5) and (6) under
either one of the following two conditions:
(i) N is sufficiently large such that p−i > a,∀i, or (ii) a = 0.
Furthermore, the solutions to the coupled algebraic Riccati equations that characterize
the feedback NE are of the following forms under the corresponding conditions above:
(s-i) pi = (p¯− a)−
√
(p¯− a)2 − σi ;
(s-ii) pi = p¯−
√
p¯2 − σi, where
p¯− a = 1
N − 1
(
N∑
i=1
√
(p¯− a)2 − σi + a
)
. (14)
Moreover, the stability condition a−∑Ni=1 siki < 0 is satisfied, and hence the FB NE
is stabilizing.
Proof From (9), we obtain
p2i + 2(p−i − a)pi − σi = 0, (15)
which admits the solutions:
pi = (a− p−i)±
√
(a− p−i)2 + σi. (16)
Since we need pi > 0, we retain the one with “ + ” sign. By rearranging the positive
solution of (16), we arrive at
(p¯− a)2 = (p−i − a)2 + σi , (17)
and, therefore, in terms of p¯, we have
pi = (p¯− a)±
√
(p¯− a)2 − σi. (18)
Under condition (i), we have pi − p¯+ a < 0, hence we obtain the unique solution (s-i).
Under scenario (ii), (18) reduces to pi = p¯±
√
p¯2 − σi. Since, pi < p¯, we again obtain
the unique solution (s-ii).
By summing over (18), we have a fixed point equation (14). Let
P¯ (p¯) :=
1
N − 1
(
N∑
i=1
√
(p¯− a)2 − σi + a
)
− (p¯− a) .
Its derivative is given by
dP¯
dp¯
= −1 + p¯− a
N − 1
(
N∑
i=1
1√
(a− p¯)2 − σi
)
.
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Since σi > 0 and p¯− a > 0, it follows that
dP¯
dp¯
> −1 + p¯− a
N − 1
(
N
(p¯− a)
)
(19)
=
1
N − 1 > 0, for N > 2. (20)
This says that P¯ is a monotonically increasing function, and hence the solution to
P¯ = 0 is unique. Hence, under (i) or (ii), there exists a unique feedback NE.
The fact that the solution is stabilizing follows directly from (7), where the first
term has to be negative because the second and third terms are positive.
3.2 Team Model
When players form a team to achieve an optimal social objective, a specific total cost
is minimized. Let q¯µ =
∑N
i=1 µiqi, Rµ = diag{µ1r1, . . . , µN rN}, and consider
(FOC) min
u(t)
∫ ∞
0
(
q¯µx
2(t) + uT (t)Rµu(t)
)
dt
s.t. x˙(t) = ax(t) +
N∑
i=1
biui(t) , x(0) = x0 6= 0 .
The solution to this optimal control problem is standard, and is given below for
future reference (where we suppress the dependence of q¯ and R on µ).
Theorem 4 [Centralized Optimization] The optimal control problem (FOC) admits a
unique feedback solution which is further stabilizing. The optimal policies are
γ◦i (x) = − biµiri kˆµ x , kˆµ :=
a+
√
a2 + q¯b¯
b¯
, (21)
with b¯ :=
∑N
i=1(b
2
i /µiri), and minimum cost is J
◦
µ = kˆµx
2
0.
The optimal control can also be expressed in open-loop form, as:
u◦i = − biµiri kˆµΦ(t, 0)x0,
where Φ(t, 0) is the unique solution to
Φ˙(t, 0) =
(
a−
N∑
i=1
b2i
µiri
kˆµ
)
Φ(t, 0), Φ(0, 0) = 1.
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3.3 Price of Anarchy (PoA)
Here, we provide a closed-form expression for the PoA in the feedback LQ DG, where
we make the natural assumption that x0 6= 0, as otherwise the costs are all zero.
Theorem 5 The PoA of the LQ feedback DG described by (5) and (6) is characterized
by the following:
(i) Given a weight vector µ, the PoA ρµ is equal to
ρFBµ = max
k∈K
[µTk ] /kˆ , (22)
where µ = [0, µT , 0, . . . , 0]T and K is the set of all eigenvectors of the matrix M.
(ii) Suppose µi = µ¯i := si /
∑N
j=1 sj , i ∈ N . Then,
ρFBµ¯ 6 [ ̺(M) + a ] /
N∑
i=1
sikˆ ,
where ̺(M) is the spectral radius of M.
(iii) Let µsmax = maxi∈N µi/si. Given a weight vector µ that satisfies
∑N
i=1 µi = 1,
the PoA is bounded by
ρFBµ 6 µ
s
max(̺(M) + a) /kˆ. (23)
Proof The proof is a direct application of the results in Theorem 1 and Theorem 4.
PoA is the worst-case ratio of the game cost under feedback NE to the optimum social
cost as defined in (2). Under the feedback IS, an LQ DG has
ρFBµ = max
k∗
∑N
i=1 µik
∗
i (x0)
2
kˆ(x0)2
= max
k∈K
µTk
kˆ
.
This leads to statement (i). The price of anarchy under µ¯ is
ρFBµ¯ = max
k
∑N
i=1 µ¯iki
kˆ
= max
k
siki∑N
i=1 sikˆ
= max
λ
λ+ a∑N
i=1 sikˆ
. (24)
The last equality is due to (8). Hence, by taking the largest eigenvalue, we obtain (ii).
The equality is achieved when ̺(M) is an eigenvalue in the eigenvalue-eigenvector pair
that yields the equilibrium from Theorem 2. For an arbitrarily picked µ, (22) yields
ρFBµ¯ = max
k
∑N
i=1
µi
si
siki
kˆ
6 max
k
usmax
∑N
i=1 siki
kˆ
= max
λ
usmax(λ+ a)
kˆ
6
usmax(̺(M) + a)
kˆ
. (25)
Using (8) and taking the worst case, we obtain statement (iii). Since
max
i∈N
µ¯i
si
=
1∑N
j=1 sj
,
the last inequality is achieved when µ = µ¯.
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The next corollary further characterizes the bound on PoA.
Corollary 1 The following follow from Theorem 5:
(i) Given a µ and a 6= 0, PoA is bounded above by
ρFBµ 6
(
1 +
1
2a
(N + σmax − 1)
)
s•, (26)
where σmax = maxi∈N σi, and
s• :=
N∑
i=1
si
minj∈N sj
.
The upper-bound is independent of µ.
(ii) If a = 0, PoA is bounded above by
ρFBµ 6
µsmax√
q¯
√
µsmin
√
N(N + σmax − 1), (27)
where µsmin = mini∈N µi/si.
Proof The matrices M = [mij ] and M˜ = [m˜ij ], i, j = 1, . . . , 2
N , share the same set of
eigenvalues. From Gersgorin theorem, we can obtain
̺(M˜) 6 min

maxi
2N∑
j=1
|m˜ij |,max
j
2N∑
i=1
|m˜ij |

 6 maxi
2N∑
j=1
|m˜ij |.
From (10) and (11), the absolute row sum RSk, k = 1, . . . , 2
N , can easily be evaluated
by letting pi = 1:
RSk = [a+
∑
i∈Ω
σi + (N − nΩ)] / [2nΩ − 1],
where k is the row index corresponding to the set Ω. When Ω = ∅, we let RS1 = N+a.
From (23),
ρFBµ 6 [ ̺(M) + a ]/(kˆ/µ
s
max).
The numerator is upper-bounded by (skipping some steps):
̺(M) + a 6 max
{
max
16nΩ6N
(2a+ σmax − 1)nΩ +N
2nΩ − 1
, 2a+N − 1
}
6 max {2a+N + σmax − 1, 2a+N − 1}
6 2a+N + σmax − 1. (28)
The second inequality holds because the quantity
(2a+ σmax − 1)nΩ +N
2nΩ − 1
increases with nΩ . The denominator has a lower bound:
2a
b¯µsmax
>
2a∑N
i=1
(
maxi∈N µi/si
µi
)
b2i
ri
>
2a∑N
i=1
si
mini∈N si
=
2a
s• . (29)
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The last inequality is due to maxi µi/si 6 maxi µimaxi
1
si
. Combining (28) and (29),
we have, for a 6= 0,
ρFBµ 6
(
1 +
1
2a
(N + σmax − 1)
)
s•
When a = 0,
kˆ =
√
q¯/b¯ =
√
q¯∑N
i=1
si
µi
>
√
q¯µsmin√
N
.
Using this together with (28), we arrive at the inequality (27).
The upper bound on price of anarchy in the preceding corollary provides a worst
case of efficiency loss.
The next result studies the large population game and its proof relies on the Taylor
series expansion of the square-root term in (18).
Theorem 6 Suppose the number of players in the LQ DG is sufficiently large so that
(C-i) p−i > a,∀i ∈ N , (C-ii) a≪ N , (C-iii) σmax ≪ σ¯ ,
where σ¯ =
∑N
i=1 σi. Then, the following quantities can be approximated as given:
(i) pi ∼ σi√
2σ¯
, (ii) ui ∼ − σi
bi
√
2σ¯
x ,
(iii) J∗ ∼ q¯√
2σ¯
(x0)
2 , (iv) J∗ ∼ q¯√
2σ¯
(x0)
2 ,
(v) ρFBµ ∼ q¯
kˆ
√
2σ¯
, and for a = 0, ρFBµ ∼
√
q¯b¯
2σ¯
.
Proof By Taylor series expansion, (18) can be written as
pi = (p¯− a)
[
1−
√
1− σi
(p¯− a)2
]
=
σi
2(p¯− a)
[
1 +O
(
σi
(p¯− a)2
)]
, (30)
where O(·) is a function such that limx→0O(x) = 0. In a similar way, (14) can be
rewritten as (skipping some steps):
p¯− a = p¯− a
N − 1
(
N∑
i=1
√
1− σi
(p¯− a)2 + a
)
=
p¯− a
N − 1
[
Nσ¯
2(p¯− a)2
(
1 +O
(
σmax
2(p¯− a)2
))
+ a
]
. (31)
Hence, we obtain for large N
p¯− a =
√
σ¯
2
[
1 +O
(
σmax
2(p¯− a)2
)]
(32)
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Note that p¯ − a > 0 due to the stability condition. Let σ¯ =∑Ni=1 σi, as before. Let a
solution of (32) be p¯ =
√
σ¯/2 + a, i.e.,
p¯− a =
√
σ¯
2
[
1 +O
(
σmax
σ¯
)]
. (33)
(33) is consistent provided that σmax ≪ σ and a ≪ N . Since, by Theorem 3, the
solution is unique under (C-i), p¯ can indeed be approximated by p¯ ∼ a+
√
σ¯/2, which
leads to pi ∼ σi√2σ¯ from (30). Hence, (ii)-(v) follow.
4 Open-Loop LQ Differential Games
In this section, we go back to the DGs described by (5) and (6), but with open-loop
information. Each player knows only the value of the initial state of the system. Since
the cost runs from zero to infinity, we are interested in controls that yield finite costs.
Accordingly, we restrict the controls of the players to belong to the set
UOL(x0) = {u ∈ L2[0,∞) | Ji(x0, u) <∞, ∀i ∈ N} ,
where L2[0,∞) is the space of square-integrable functions on [0,∞).
Theorem 7 [Open-Loop NE, [9], [14]] Consider the N−person LQ DG in (5) and (6),
and assume that there exists a unique solution ξ⋆ to the set of equations
0 = 2aξi + qi − ξi
 N∑
j=1
sjξj
 , (34)
such that a −∑Nj=1 sjξ⋆j < 0, where si := b2i /ri. Then, the game admits a unique
open-loop Nash equilibrium for every initial state, given by
u⋆i (t) = − biri ξ
⋆
i exp
a− N∑
j=1
sjξ
⋆
j
 t
x0 . (35)
The optimal cost to player i using u⋆i is J
⋆
i = k
⋆
i x0, where k
⋆
i is the unique solution
to
2
a− N∑
j=1
sjξ
⋆
j
 ki + qi + si(ξ⋆i )2 = 0. (36)
The quantities in Theorem 7 can be made more explicit as we discuss below. By
a slight abuse of notation, let pi := siξi as in the state-feedback information case.
Multiplying (34) and (36) by si, we obtain 0 = 2api + σi − pip¯ , and 0 = 2siki(a −
p¯) + σi + p
2
i , where p¯ =
∑N
i=1 pi. Hence we can solve for pi, ki, and obtain
pi = σi / (p¯− 2a) (37)
ki = σi + p
2
i / (2si(p¯− a)). (38)
To obtain p¯, we sum (37) over i and arrive at the quadratic equation p¯ = σ¯p¯−2a . Thus,
p¯ =
√
a2 + σ¯ + a , (39)
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where we have retained only the positive solution of the quadratic equation for obvious
reasons. It should be pointed out that since the relevant p¯ is unique, we have a unique
open-loop NE. Using (39), we can determine the expression for ξ⋆i (and thus the OL
NE strategies of the players 35), as
ξ⋆i =
qi√
a2 + σ¯ − a . (40)
Note that these are necessarily stabilizing, that is a−∑Nj=1 sjξ⋆j < 0, in view of (36).
Now using (39) and (37) in (38), we arrive at the closed-form expression for k⋆i :
k⋆i =
1√
a2 + σ¯
(
qi
2
+
σiqi
2(
√
a2 + σ¯ − a)2
)
. (41)
When a = 0, k⋆i is reduced to
k⋆i =
1√
σ¯
(
qi
2
+
σiqi
2σ¯
)
. (42)
Given weighting µ, the open-loop NE yields a total cost of
J⋆µ =
N∑
i=1
µiJ
⋆
i =
N∑
i=1
µik
⋆
i (x0)
2 =: k⋆µ(x0)
2 .
Since the open-loop NE solution is unique, the PoA under open loop IS can thus be
easily found to be:
ρOLµ = k
⋆
µ / kˆµ . (43)
We now capture all this in the corollary below.
Corollary 2 The OL LQ DG of Theorem 7 admits a unique OL NE given by (35)
and (40), which is also stabilizing. Furthermore, the OL PoA is given by (43).
5 Price of Information (PoI)
In the previous sections, we have introduced PoA as a measure of efficiency in going
from cooperative to noncooperative framework, and obtained expressions for it for FB
and OL LQ DGs . Here, we study the price of information (PoI) as a measure of
efficiency with respect to the ISs for again the LQ DG. Following Definition 3, PoI
between open-loop and feedback ISs is defined by
χOLFB = max
k⋆
JOL⋆ /max
k∗
JFB∗ , (44)
which can also be expressed in terms of the PoAs under the two ISs:
χOLFB = ρ
OL
µ / ρ
FB
µ .
Using Theorem 5, we can obtain a bound on PoI:
χOLFB >
k⋆
µsmax(̺(M) + a)
.
The following theorem further characterizes the PoI in a special case.
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Theorem 8 Suppose a = 0, and the number of players is large so that N satisfies (C-
i), (C-ii), and (C-iii). Then, the PoI is bounded from above and below by two constants:
√
2/2 6 χOLFB 6
√
2. (45)
Proof Under conditions (C-i), (C-ii), and (C-iii), we have a unique feedback NE that
can be approximated as in statement (iv) of Theorem 6. Hence, from (39) we obtain
χOLFB =
JOL⋆
JFB∗
=
√
2
2
(
1 +
∑N
i=1 µiqiσi
q¯σ¯
)
=
√
2
2
(
1 +
∑N
i=1 µiqiσi∑N
i=1 µiqi
∑N
i=1 σi
)
6
√
2 ,
where the last inequality is obtained by noting that
N∑
i=1
µiqiσi >
N∑
i=1
µiqi
N∑
i=1
σi .
The lower bound can be achieved by noting that σi, qi, µi are all nonnegative.
Theorem 8 is useful in the design of games via access control or pricing mechanisms.
Let χ¯ ∈ (
√
2
2 ,
√
2] be some target PoI to achieve so that χOLFB 6 χ¯. For example, when
χ¯ = 1, it means the game needs to be designed so that the open-loop NE yields no
larger cost than the feedback NE. Hence, a necessary condition to meet such a design
criterion is: ∑
i∈N µiqiσi
q¯σ¯
6
√
2χOLFB − 1. (46)
An access control is to admit a set N of players so that (46) is satisfied when all
the system and player parameters are given. When set N is fixed and not adjustable,
we may use “pricing” mechanisms to control the parameters ri or qi, which reflect the
unit “price” of penalty on the control effort and the state, respectively. In the following
corollary, we capture the special case of homogeneous players.
Corollary 3 Suppose the LQ DG satisfies the conditions in Theorem 8. In addition,
let the players be symmetric so that σi = σ, pi = p,∀i ∈ N . When N > 3, the open-
loop IS yields better total optimal cost; otherwise the FB information does better. In
addition, as N →∞, limN→∞ χOLFB =
√
2
2 at the rate of O
(
1
N
)
.
Proof The proof directly follows from Theorem 8. The price of information under
the additional assumptions becomes χOLFB =
1√
2
(
1 + 1N
)
. It is independent of the
parameters of the players and approaches
√
2
2 as N → ∞. By letting χOLFB 6 1, we
obtain N > 1 / (
√
2− 1) . Hence, since N is an integer, the open-loop NE does better
than the feedback NE when there are 3 or more players.
Theorem 8 and Corollary 3 have implications in the design of games via access
control when open loop is the preferred mode of play.
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6 Applications and Illustrations
In this section, we apply the results obtained heretofore to two classes of application
scenarios in flow control.
6.1 Multiuser Rate-Based Flow Control
We adopt here the communication systems model described in [2], where the players are
the users or sources, and the action (control) variables are the flows into the network.
If a link receives more total flow than what it can accommodate (measured by its
capacity), then packets queue up. Having long queues is not desirable, because it leads
to delays in transmission. We call such links which are congested bottleneck links, and
formulate the game around one such link. Let ql(t) denote the queue length at such a
bottleneck link and let s(t) denote the total effective service rate available at that link.
Assume that each user is assigned a fixed proportion of the available bandwidth; more
specifically, the traffic of source i, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , has an allotted bandwidth of wis(t),
where wi’s are positive parameters which add up to 1. We assume that the users have
perfect measurement of s(t), but occasionally exceed or fall short of the bandwidth
allotted to them due to fluctuations. Hence, if di(t) denotes the rate of source i at
time t, we can introduce ui(t) := di(t)−wisr(t) as the control (action) variable of the
source. Then, queue build-up is governed by the differential equation
q˙l(t) =
N∑
i=1
ui(t) , (47)
where we assume that queue is relatively tightly controlled so that end effect constraints
(starvation and exceeding an upper limit) do not become active. The goal is to ensure
that the bottleneck queue size stays around some desired level q¯l, and good tracking
between input and output rates is achieved. Toward that end, we consider the shifted
variable x(t) := ql(t) − q¯l, which satisfies the following differential equation which is
the shifted version of (47):
x˙(t) =
N∑
i=1
ui x(0) = x0 . (48)
We now consider a noncooperative scenario in which each source determines a linear
feedback policy (or an open-loop policy) to minimize its own individual cost function
Li(u) =
∫ ∞
0
(
|x(t)|2 + |ui(t)|2
)
dt, (49)
which is consistent with the overall goal of keeping x and ui’s small. We can also
consider a related team problem in which sources minimize cooperatively a common
cost under the same information structure (where as we know actually the IS does not
make a difference in this case):
L(u) =
∫ ∞
0
(
N |x(t)|2 +
N∑
i=1
|ui(t)|2
)
dt. (50)
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This is now within the framework of LQ DGs studied earlier, with the correspon-
dences being a = 0, x0 = 1, σi = si = qi = ri = bi = 1 in (5) and (6). To obtain some
numerical results, let us take x0 = 1.
In the case of the 2-person LQ feedback game, the M matrix introduced earlier
becomes
M2 =

0 1 1 0
1 0 0 −1
1 0 0 −1
0 1/3 1/3 0

and if N = 3, we have
M3 =

0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 −1 −1 0 0
1 0 0 0 −1 0 −1 0
1 0 0 0 0 −1 −1 0
0 1/3 1/3 0 0 0 0 −1/3
0 1/3 0 1/3 0 0 0 −1/3
0 0 1/3 1/3 0 0 0 −1/3
0 0 0 0 1/5 1/5 1/5 0

.
The positive eigenvalue ofM2 is λ2 = 1.1547 and the corresponding vector is p2 = k2 =
[1.0000, 0.5774, 0.5774, 0.3333]T . The sum of the optimal costs under equal weights is
J∗2 = 0.5774 while the optimal common cost is J◦2 = 0.5, yielding the price of anarchy
value ρFBµ,2 = 1.1547. For the case with 3 players, the eigenvector is found to be p3 =
k3 = [1.0000, 0.4472, 0.4472, 0.4472, 0.2000, 0.2000, 0.2000, 0.0894]
T corresponding to
λ3 = 1.3416. Again under equal weights, the total NE cost is J
∗
3 = 0.4472 and the
minimum social cost is J◦3 = 0.3333. Hence, the price of anarchy is given by ρFBµ,3 =
1.3416. When the number of players becomes large, ρFBµ ∼
√
N
2 from Theorem 6.
In the case of open-loop flow control, we obtain k⋆i =
1√
N
(
1
2 +
1
2N
)
and total NE
cost as J⋆N = k
⋆. In the 2-user game, J⋆2 = 0.5303 yielding the price of information
χOLFB = 0.9184. The open-loop NE thus yields 8.16% less cost in comparison to the
closed-loop FB one. In a 3-user game, J⋆3 = 0.3849, leading to a price of information
value of χOLFB = 0.8607, which yields a 13.93% more cost for the FB IS case. We also
note that as the number of players increases, the open-loop IS yields a cost approaching
0, i.e., limN→∞ J⋆N = 0, while in the feedback case, even though it still converges to
0, the rate is slower: J∗ ∼ 1√
2N
→ 0. We observe that χOLFB goes to
√
2
2 at a rate of
1
N
as N gets large, i.e.,
lim
N→∞
χOLFB =
√
2
2
+
1
2N
→
√
2
2
.
It is also noted that open-loop NEs always yield less equilibrium costs even though
they require less information.
Due to the symmetry of players in the flow control problem, we can obtain exact
closed-form solutions to the equilibrium costs using (18) and (14) without approxima-
tion. It is not hard to show that under equal weights,
J∗OL = ki =
1√
2N − 1 , J
⋆
FB =
1√
N
(
1
2
+
1
2N
)
and J◦ = 1
N
.
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Fig. 1 Price of Information
In Figure 1, we show the price of information under open-loop and feedback information
structures, and in Figure 2, we show the corresponding prices of anarchy. By exact
calculation, we find when N = 4, the open-loop NE cost to be J⋆4 =
3
8 = 0.3125, which
catches up with and becomes better than the feedback NE cost: J∗4 = 1√7 = 0.378.This
is consistent with our earlier observation based on large population approximation.
We observe in Figure 1 that the NE costs are the same at N = 1 (as they should
be), and as N increases, both open-loop and feedback NE costs decrease. AsN becomes
large, both costs approach 0. This happens because the queue length is fixed. When
the number of players goes to infinity, the contribution from each user is negligible.
Moreover, the state x(t) can be driven to zero very fast as the amount of total con-
trol effort increases with the number of players. The cost incurred from the transient
behavior of x(t) then goes to zero. In addition, for N > 2, open-loop NE yields better
costs. The price of information χOLFB is always below 1 but maintains its level above√
2
2 . In Figure 2, the price of anarchy starts at 1 when N = 1 and increases as the
number of players grows. The cost under the feedback NE grows faster than the one
under open-loop NE.
6.2 Normalized Flow Control Dynamics
In this section, we investigate a general flow control dynamics, which differs from (48)
by inclusion of a population-dependent normalization factor f(N), where f(·) is an
increasing function of N :
x˙(t) =
1
f(N)
N∑
i=1
ui , x(0) = 1 . (51)
The introduction of a normalization factor is to adjust the queue length proportionally
when the number of users increases.
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Proposition 1 The prices of anarchy ρOLµ , ρ
FB
µ , and the price of information χ
OL
FB
are independent of the normalization factor f(N), as summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 Various indices for normalized flow control game
J∗ (FB) J◦ (TP) J⋆ (OL) ρFBµ ρ
OL
µ χ
OL
FB
f(N)√
2N−1
f(N)
N
f(N)√
N
(
1
2
+ 1
2N
)
N√
2N−1
√
N
(
N+1
2N
) √
2− 1
N
(
1
2
+ 1
N
)
Proof Using (18) and (14), we obtain pi for a given N as follows:
p¯ =
N
f(N)
1√
2N − 1 ,
pi =
1
f(N)
√
2N − 1 ,
ki =
pi
si
=
f(N)√
2N − 1 ,
J∗ =
N∑
i=1
1
N
kix
2
0 = ki.
The team problem yields an optimal cost of
J◦ =
√
q¯
b¯
=
f(N)
N
. (52)
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Table 2 Indices under two normalization factors using the large population approximation
f(N) J∗ (FB) J◦ (TP) J⋆ (OL) ρFBµ ρ
OL
µ χ
OL
FB
1 1√
2N
1
N
1√
N
(
1
2
+ 1
2N
) √
N
2
√
N
(
1
2
+ 1
2N
) √
2
2
+
√
2
2N
1
N
√
N
2
1
√
N
(
1
2
+ 1
2N
) √
N
2
√
N
(
1
2
+ 1
2N
) √
2
2
+
√
2
2N
Hence, the price of anarchy ρFBµ under the state-feedback information structure is
independent of f(N), and is given by
ρFBµ =
N√
2N − 1 (53)
The open-loop price of anarchy is also independent of the factor f(N). Since J⋆ =
f(N)√
N
(
1
2 +
1
N
)
, it is given by
ρOLµ =
√
N
(
N + 1
2N
)
. (54)
The price of information is also independent of f(N), and given by
χOLFB =
√
2− 1
N
(
1
2
+
1
N
)
. (55)
As a case study, we let f(N) = 1N . Then, bi =
1
N , si = σi =
1
N2
, for all i ∈ N .
When the population is large, we have J∗ ∼
√
N
2 and J
⋆ =
√
N
(
1
2 +
1
N
)
. The price of
anarchy remains ρ ∼
√
N
2 . The price of information remains χ
OL
FB =
√
2
2 +
√
2
2N →
√
2
2 as
N →∞. It can be shown that χOLFB does not change with the factor f(N). In Figures 3
and 4, we show the prices based on the exact closed form solution obtained in the same
fashion as in the previous section based on (18) and (14). We observe that the open-
loop NE always outperforms the feedback equilibrium. It should be pointed out that
(i) in Figure 3, the open-loop and feedback costs increase with the number of users.
This is due to the introduction of normalization factor into the system dynamics. We
allocate the queue length as an increasing function of the number of users; (ii) Figures
4 and 2 are identical due to the above proposition.
If we set f(N) =
√
N , we have the open-loop and feedback optimal costs approach
1
2 and
√
2
2 respectively, as N →∞. Figure 5 demonstrates that result.
A summary of the results with f(N) = 1 and f(N) = 1N under large population
approximation is provided in Table 2.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced the notions of price of anarchy, price of information,
and price of cooperation for nonzero-sum differential games, have studied the first two
extensively for a class of scalar linear-quadratic differential games, and have obtained
bounds and approximations on them, with computable bounds available in the large
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population regime. Future promising work is to extend these results to non-scalar
differential games as well as to obtain their counterparts for the price of cooperation.
Also computing these indices for specific models from communication networks and
economics would be a fruitful area of research.
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